|Saint Thomas Aquinas
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Logos Virtual Library
Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province
First Part of the Second Part
Treatise on Manís Last End (Questions 1-5)
We have now to consider happiness: and (1) in what it consists; (2) what it is; (3) how we can obtain it.
Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether happiness consists in wealth? (2) Whether in honor? (3) Whether in fame or glory? (4) Whether in power? (5) Whether in any good of the body? (6) Whether in pleasure? (7) Whether in any good of the soul? (8) Whether in any created good?
We proceed thus to the First Article:ó
Objection 1. It would seem that manís happiness consists in wealth. For since happiness is manís last end, it must consist in that which has the greatest hold on manís affections. Now this is wealth: for it is written (Eccles. x. 19): All things obey money. Therefore manís happiness consists in wealth.
Obj. 2. Further, according to BoŽthius (De Consol. iii), happiness is a state of life made perfect by the aggregate of all good things. Now money seems to be the means of possessing all things: for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v. 5), money was invented, that it might be a sort of guarantee for the acquisition of whatever man desires. Therefore happiness consists in wealth.
Obj. 3. Further, since the desire for the sovereign good never fails, it seems to be infinite. But this is the case with riches more than anything else; since a covetous man shall not be satisfied with riches (Eccles. v. 9). Therefore happiness consists in wealth.
On the contrary, Manís good consists in retaining happiness rather than in spreading it. But as BoŽthius says (De Consol. ii), wealth shines in giving rather than in hoarding: for the miser is hateful, whereas the generous man is applauded. Therefore manís happiness does not consist in wealth.
I answer that, It is impossible for manís happiness to consist in wealth. For wealth is twofold, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i. 3), viz., natural and artificial. Natural wealth is that which serves man as a remedy for his natural wants: such as food, drink, clothing, cars, dwellings, and such like, while artificial wealth is that which is not a direct help to nature, as money, but is invented by the art of man, for the convenience of exchange, and as a measure of things salable.
Now it is evident that manís happiness cannot consist in natural wealth. For wealth of this kind is sought for the sake of something else, viz., as a support of human nature: consequently it cannot be manís last end, rather is it ordained to man as to its end. Wherefore in the order of nature, all such things are below man, and made for him, according to Ps. viii. 8: Thou hast subjected all things under his feet.
And as to artificial wealth, it is not sought save for the sake of natural wealth; since man would not seek it except because, by its means, he procures for himself the necessaries of life. Consequently much less can it be considered in the light of the last end. Therefore it is impossible for happiness, which is the last end of man, to consist in wealth.
Reply Obj. 1. All material things obey money, so far as the multitude of fools is concerned, who know no other than material goods, which can be obtained for money. But we should take our estimation of human goods not from the foolish but from the wise: just as it is for a person whose sense of taste is in good order, to judge whether a thing is palatable.
Reply Obj. 2. All things salable can be had for money: not so spiritual things, which cannot be sold. Hence it is written (Prov. xvii. 16): What doth it avail a fool to have riches, seeing he cannot buy wisdom.
Reply Obj. 3. The desire for natural riches is not infinite: because they suffice for nature in a certain measure. But the desire for artificial wealth is infinite, for it is the servant of disordered concupiscence, which is not curbed, as the Philosopher makes clear (Polit. i. 3). Yet this desire for wealth is infinite otherwise than the desire for the sovereign good. For the more perfectly the sovereign good is possessed, the more it is loved, and other things despised: because the more we possess it, the more we know it. Hence it is written (Ecclus. xxiv. 29): They that eat me shall yet hunger. Whereas in the desire for wealth and for whatsoever temporal goods, the contrary is the case: for when we already possess them, we despise them, and seek others: which is the sense of Our Lordís words (Jo. iv. 13): Whosoever drinketh of this water, by which temporal goods are signified, shall thirst again. The reason of this is that we realize more their insufficiency when we possess them: and this very fact shows that they are imperfect, and that the sovereign good does not consist therein.
We proceed thus to the Second Article:ó
Objection 1. It would seem that manís happiness consists in honors. For happiness or bliss is the reward of virtue, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i. 9). But honor more than anything else seems to be that by which virtue is rewarded, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv. 3). Therefore happiness consists especially in honor.
Obj. 2. Further, that which belongs to God and to persons of great excellence seems especially to be happiness, which is the perfect good. But that is honor, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv. 3). Moreover, the Apostle says (1 Tim. i. 17): ToÖthe only God be honor and glory. Therefore happiness consists in honor.
Obj. 3. Further, that which man desires above all is happiness. But nothing seems more desirable to man than honor: since man suffers loss in all other things, lest he should suffer loss of honor. Therefore happiness consists in honor.
On the contrary, Happiness is in the happy. But honor is not in the honored, but rather in him who honors, and who offers deference to the person honored, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i. 5). Therefore happiness does not consist in honor.
I answer that, It is impossible for happiness to consist in honor. For honor is given to a man on account of some excellence in him; and consequently it is a sign and attestation of the excellence that is in the person honored. Now a manís excellence is in proportion, especially to his happiness, which is manís perfect good; and to its parts, i.e., those goods by which he has a certain share of happiness. And therefore honor can result from happiness, but happiness cannot principally consist therein.
Reply Obj. 1. As the Philosopher says (Ethic. i. 5), honor is not that reward of virtue, for which the virtuous work: but they receive honor from men by way of reward, as from those who have nothing greater to offer. But virtueís true reward is happiness itself, for which the virtuous work: whereas if they worked for honor, it would no longer be a virtue, but ambition.
Reply Obj. 2. Honor is due to God and to persons of great excellence as a sign of attestation of excellence already existing: not that honor makes them excellent.
Reply Obj. 3. That man desires honor above all else, arises from his natural desire for happiness, from which honor results, as stated above. Wherefore man seeks to be honored especially by the wise, on whose judgment he believes himself to be excellent or happy.
We proceed thus to the Third Article:ó
Objection 1. It would seem that manís happiness consists in glory. For happiness seems to consist in that which is paid to the saints for the trials they have undergone in the world. But this is glory: for the Apostle says (Rom. viii. 18): The sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us. Therefore happiness consists in glory.
Obj. 2. Further, good is diffusive of itself, as stated by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But manís good is spread abroad in the knowledge of others by glory more than by anything else: since, according to Ambrose [Augustine,óContra Maxim. Arian. ii. 13], glory consists in being well known and praised. Therefore manís happiness consists in glory.
Obj. 3. Further, happiness is the most enduring good. Now this seems to be fame or glory; because by this men attain to eternity after a fashion. Hence BoŽthius says (De Consol. ii): You seem to beget unto yourselves eternity, when you think of your fame in future time. Therefore manís happiness consists in fame or glory.
On the contrary, Happiness is manís true good. But it happens that fame or glory is false: for as BoŽthius says (De Consol. iii), many owe their renown to the lying reports spread among the people. Can anything be more shameful? For those who receive false fame, must needs blush at their own praise. Therefore manís happiness does not consist in fame or glory.
I answer that, Manís happiness cannot consist in human fame or glory. For glory consists in being well known and praised, as Ambrose [Augustine,óContra Maxim. Arian. ii. 13] says. Now the thing known is related to human knowledge otherwise than to Godís knowledge: for human knowledge is caused by the things known, whereas Godís knowledge is the cause of the things known. Wherefore the perfection of human good, which is called happiness, cannot be caused by human knowledge: but rather human knowledge of anotherís happiness proceeds from, and, in a fashion, is caused by, human happiness itself, inchoate or perfect. Consequently manís happiness cannot consist in fame or glory. On the other hand, manís good depends on Godís knowledge as its cause. And therefore manís beatitude depends, as on its cause, on the glory which man has with God; according to Ps. xc. 15, 16: I will deliver him, and I will glorify him; I will fill him with length of days, and I will show him my salvation.
Furthermore, we must observe that human knowledge often fails, especially in contingent singulars, such as are human acts. For this reason human glory is frequently deceptive. But since God cannot be deceived, His glory is always true; hence it is written (2 Cor. x. 18): HeÖis approvedÖwhom God commendeth.
Reply Obj. 1. The Apostle speaks, then, not of the glory which is with men, but of the glory which is from God, with His Angels. Hence it is written (Mk. viii. 38): The Son of Man shall confess him in the glory of His Father, before His angels. [St. Thomas joins Mark viii. 38 with Luke xii. 8, owing to a possible variant in his text, or to the fact that he was quoting from memory.]
Reply Obj. 2. A manís good which, through fame or glory, is in the knowledge of many, if this knowledge be true, must needs be derived from good existing in the man himself: and hence it presupposes perfect or inchoate happiness. But if the knowledge be false, it does not harmonize with the thing: and thus good does not exist in him who is looked upon as famous. Hence it follows that fame can nowise make man happy.
Reply Obj. 3. Fame has no stability; in fact, it is easily ruined by false report. And if sometimes it endures, this is by accident. But happiness endures of itself, and for ever.
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:ó
Objection 1. It would seem that happiness consists in power. For all things desire to become like to God, as to their last end and first beginning. But men who are in power, seem, on account of the similarity of power, to be most like to God: hence also in Scripture they are called gods (Exod. xxii. 28),óThou shalt not speak ill of the gods. Therefore happiness consists in power.
Obj. 2. Further, happiness is the perfect good. But the highest perfection for man is to be able to rule others; which belongs to those who are in power. Therefore happiness consists in power.
Obj. 3. Further, since happiness is supremely desirable, it is contrary to that which is before all to be shunned. But, more than aught else, men shun servitude, which is contrary to power. Therefore happiness consists in power.
On the contrary, Happiness is the perfect good. But power is most imperfect. For as BoŽthius says (De Consol. iii), the power of man cannot relieve the gnawings of care, nor can it avoid the thorny path of anxiety: and further on: Think you a man is powerful who is surrounded by attendants, whom he inspires with fear indeed, but whom he fears still more?
I answer that, It is impossible for happiness to consist in power; and this for two reasons. First because power has the nature of principle, as is stated in Metaph. v. 12, whereas happiness has the nature of last end.óSecondly, because power has relation to good and evil: whereas happiness is manís proper and perfect good. Wherefore some happiness might consist in the good use of power, which is by virtue, rather than in power itself.
Now four general reasons may be given to prove that happiness consists in none of the foregoing external goods. First, because, since happiness is manís supreme good, it is incompatible with any evil. Now all the foregoing can be found both in good and in evil men.óSecondly, because, since it is the nature of happiness to satisfy of itself, as stated in Ethic. i. 7, having gained happiness, man cannot lack any needful good. But after acquiring any one of the foregoing, man may still lack many goods that are necessary to him; for instance, wisdom, bodily health, and such like.óThirdly, because, since happiness is the perfect good, no evil can accrue to anyone therefrom. This cannot be said of the foregoing: for it is written (Eccles. v. 12) that riches are sometimes kept to the hurt of the owner; and the same may be said of the other three.óFourthly, because man is ordained to happiness through principles that are in him; since he is ordained thereto naturally. Now the four goods mentioned above are due rather to external causes, and in most cases to fortune; for which reason they are called goods of fortune. Therefore it is evident that happiness nowise consists in the foregoing.
Reply Obj. 1. Godís power is His goodness: hence He cannot use His power otherwise than well. But it is not so with men. Consequently it is not enough for manís happiness, that he become like God in power, unless he become like Him in goodness also.
Reply Obj. 2. Just as it is a very good thing for a man to make good use of power in ruling many, so is it a very bad thing if he makes a bad use of it. And so it is that power is towards good and evil.
Reply Obj. 3. Servitude is a hindrance to the good use of power: therefore is it that men naturally shun it; not because manís supreme good consists in power.
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:ó
Objection 1. It would seem that manís happiness consists in bodily goods. For it is written (Ecclus. xxx. 16): There is no riches above the riches of the health of the body. But happiness consists in that which is best. Therefore it consists in the health of the body.
Obj. 2. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v), that to be is better than to live, and to live is better than all that follows. But for manís being and living, the health of the body is necessary. Since, therefore, happiness is manís supreme good, it seems that health of the body belongs more than anything else to happiness.
Obj. 3. Further, the more universal a thing is, the higher the principle from which it depends; because the higher a cause is, the greater the scope of its power. Now just as the causality of the efficient cause consists in its flowing into something, so the causality of the end consists in its drawing the appetite. Therefore, just as the First Cause is that which flows into all things, so the last end is that which attracts the desire of all. But being itself is that which is most desired by all. Therefore manís happiness consists most of all in things pertaining to his being, such as the health of the body.
On the contrary, Man surpasses all other animals in regard to happiness. But in bodily goods he is surpassed by many animals; for instance, by the elephant in longevity, by the lion in strength, by the stag in fleetness. Therefore manís happiness does not consist in goods of the body.
I answer that, It is impossible for manís happiness to consist in the goods of the body; and this for two reasons. First, because, if a thing be ordained to another as to its end, its last end cannot consist in the preservation of its being. Hence a captain does not intend as a last end, the preservation of the ship entrusted to him, since a ship is ordained to something else as its end, viz., to navigation. Now just as the ship is entrusted to the captain that he may steer its course, so man is given over to his will and reason; according to Ecclus. xv. 14: God made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel. Now it is evident that man is ordained to something as his end: since man is not the supreme good. Therefore the last end of manís reason and will cannot be the preservation of manís being.
Secondly, because, granted that the end of manís will and reason be the preservation of manís being, it could not be said that the end of man is some good of the body. For manís being consists in soul and body; and though the being of the body depends on the soul, yet the being of the human soul depends not on the body, as shown above (I, Q. 75, A. 2); and the very body is for the soul, as matter for its form, and the instruments for the man that puts them into motion, that by their means he may do his work. Wherefore all goods of the body are ordained to the goods of the soul, as to their end. Consequently happiness, which is manís last end, cannot consist in goods of the body.
Reply Obj. 1. Just as the body is ordained to the soul, as its end, so are external goods ordained to the body itself. And therefore it is with reason that the good of the body is preferred to external goods, which are signified by riches, just as the good of the soul is preferred to all bodily goods.
Reply Obj. 2. Being taken simply, as including all perfection of being, surpasses life and all that follows it; for thus being itself includes all these. And in this sense Dionysius speaks. But if we consider being itself as participated in this or that thing, which does not possess the whole perfection of being, but has imperfect being, such as the being of any creature; then it is evident that being itself together with an additional perfection is more excellent. Hence in the same passage Dionysius says that things that live are better than things that exist, and intelligent better than living things.
Reply Obj. 3. Since the end corresponds to the beginning; this argument proves that the last end is the first beginning of being, in Whom every perfection of being is: Whose likeness, according to their proportion, some desire as to being only, some as to living being, some as to being which is living, intelligent and happy. And this belongs to few.
We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:ó
Objection 1. It would seem that manís happiness consists in pleasure. For since happiness is the last end, it is not desired for something else, but other things for it. But this answers to pleasure more than to anything else: for it is absurd to ask anyone what is his motive in wishing to be pleased (Ethic. x. 2). Therefore happiness consists principally in pleasure and delight.
Obj. 2. Further, the first cause goes more deeply into the effect than the second cause (De Causis 1). Now the causality of the end consists in its attracting the appetite. Therefore, seemingly that which moves most the appetite, answers to the notion of the last end. Now this is pleasure: and a sign of this is that delight so far absorbs manís will and reason, that it causes him to despise other goods. Therefore it seems that manís last end, which is happiness, consists principally in pleasure.
Obj. 3. Further, since desire is for good, it seems that what all desire is best. But all desire delight; both wise and foolish, and even irrational creatures. Therefore delight is the best of all. Therefore happiness, which is the supreme good, consists in pleasure.
On the contrary, BoŽthius says (De Consol. iii): Any one that chooses to look back on his past excesses, will perceive that pleasures had a sad ending: and if they can render a man happy, there is no reason why we should not say that the very beasts are happy too.
I answer that, Because bodily delights are more generally known, the name of pleasure has been appropriated to them (Ethic. vii. 13), although other delights excel them: and yet happiness does not consist in them. Because in every thing, that which pertains to its essence is distinct from its proper accident: thus in man it is one thing that he is a mortal rational animal, and another that he is a risible animal. We must therefore consider that every delight is a proper accident resulting from happiness, or from some part of happiness; since the reason that a man is delighted is that he has some fitting good, either in reality, or in hope, or at least in memory. Now a fitting good, if indeed it be the perfect good, is precisely manís happiness: and if it is imperfect, it is a share of happiness, either proximate, or remote, or at least apparent. Therefore it is evident that neither is delight, which results from the perfect good, the very essence of happiness, but something resulting therefrom as its proper accident.
But bodily pleasure cannot result from the perfect good even in that way. For it results from a good apprehended by sense, which is a power of the soul, which power makes use of the body. Now good pertaining to the body, and apprehended by sense, cannot be manís perfect good. For since the rational soul excels the capacity of corporeal matter, that part of the soul which is independent of a corporeal organ, has a certain infinity in regard to the body and those parts of the soul which are tied down to the body: just as immaterial things are in a way infinite as compared to material things, since a form is, after a fashion, contracted and bounded by matter, so that a form which is independent of matter is, in a way, infinite. Therefore sense, which is a power of the body, knows the singular, which is determinate through matter: whereas the intellect, which is a power independent of matter, knows the universal, which is abstracted from matter, and contains an infinite number of singulars. Consequently it is evident that good which is fitting to the body, and which causes bodily delight through being apprehended by sense, is not manís perfect good, but is quite a trifle as compared with the good of the soul. Hence it is written (Wisd. vii. 9) that all gold in comparison of her, is as a little sand. And therefore bodily pleasure is neither happiness itself, nor a proper accident of happiness.
Reply Obj. 1. It comes to the same whether we desire good, or desire delight, which is nothing else than the appetiteís rest in good: thus it is owing to the same natural force that a weighty body is borne downwards and that it rests there. Consequently just as good is desired for itself, so delight is desired for itself and not for anything else, if the preposition for denote the final cause. But if it denote the formal or rather the motive cause, thus delight is desirable for something else, i.e., for the good, which is the object of that delight, and consequently is its principle, and gives it its form: for the reason that delight is desired is that it is rest in the thing desired.
Reply Obj. 2. The vehemence of desire for sensible delight arises from the fact that operations of the senses, through being the principles of our knowledge, are more perceptible. And so it is that sensible pleasures are desired by the majority.
Reply Obj. 3. All desire delight in the same way as they desire good: and yet they desire delight by reason of the good and not conversely, as stated above (ad 1). Consequently it does not follow that delight is the supreme and essential good, but that every delight results from some good, and that some delight results from that which is the essential and supreme good.
We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:ó
Objection 1. It would seem that some good of the soul constitutes manís happiness. For happiness is manís good. Now this is threefold: external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. But happiness does not consist in external goods, nor in goods of the body, as shown above (AA. 4, 5). Therefore it consists in goods of the soul.
Obj. 2. Further, we love that for which we desire good, more than the good that we desire for it: thus we love a friend for whom we desire money, more than we love money. But whatever good a man desires, he desires it for himself. Therefore he loves himself more than all other goods. Now happiness is what is loved above all: which is evident from the fact that for its sake all else is loved and desired. Therefore happiness consists in some good of man himself: not, however, in goods of the body; therefore, in goods of the soul.
Obj. 3. Further, perfection is something belonging to that which is perfected. But happiness is a perfection of man. Therefore happiness is something belonging to man. But it is not something belonging to the body, as shown above (A. 5). Therefore it is something belonging to the soul; and thus it consists in goods of the soul.
On the contrary, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i. 22), that which constitutes the life of happiness is to be loved for its own sake. But man is not to be loved for his own sake, but whatever is in man is to be loved for Godís sake. Therefore happiness consists in no good of the soul.
I answer that, As stated above (Q. 1, A. 8), the end is twofold: namely, the thing itself, which we desire to attain, and the use, namely, the attainment or possession of that thing. If, then, we speak of manís last end, it is impossible for manís last end to be the soul itself or something belonging to it. Because the soul, considered in itself, is as something existing in potentiality: for it becomes knowing actually, from being potentially knowing; and actually virtuous, from being potentially virtuous. Now since potentiality is for the sake of act as for its fulfilment, that which in itself is in potentiality cannot be the last end. Therefore the soul itself cannot be its own last end.
In like manner neither can anything belonging to it, whether power, habit, or act. For that good which is the last end, is the perfect good fulfilling the desire. Now manís appetite, otherwise the will, is for the universal good. And any good inherent to the soul is a participated good, and consequently a portioned good. Therefore none of them can be manís last end.
But if we speak of manís last end, as to the attainment or possession thereof, or as to any use whatever of the thing itself desired as an end, thus does something of man, in respect of his soul, belong to his last end: since man attains happiness through his soul. Therefore the thing itself which is desired as end, is that which constitutes happiness, and makes man happy; but the attainment of this thing is called happiness. Consequently we must say that happiness is something belonging to the soul; but that which constitutes happiness is something outside the soul.
Reply Obj. 1. Inasmuch as this division includes all goods that man can desire, thus the good of the soul is not only power, habit, or act, but also the object of these, which is something outside. And in this way nothing hinders us from saying that what constitutes happiness is a good of the soul.
Reply Obj. 2. As far as the proposed objection is concerned, happiness is loved above all, as the good desired; whereas a friend is loved as that for which good is desired; and thus, too, man loves himself. Consequently it is not the same kind of love in both cases. As to whether man loves anything more than himself with the love of friendship there will be occasion to inquire when we treat of Charity.
Reply Obj. 3. Happiness itself, since it is a perfection of the soul, is an inherent good of the soul; but that which constitutes happiness, viz., which makes man happy, is something outside his soul, as stated above.
We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:ó
Objection 1. It would seem that some created good constitutes manís happiness. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that Divine wisdom unites the ends of first things to the beginnings of second things, from which we may gather that the summit of a lower nature touches the base of the higher nature. But manís highest good is happiness. Since then the angel is above man in the order of nature, as stated in the First Part (Q. 111, A. 1), it seems that manís happiness consists in man somehow reaching the angel.
Obj. 2. Further, the last end of each thing is that which, in relation to it, is perfect: hence the part is for the whole, as for its end. But the universe of creatures which is called the macrocosm, is compared to man who is called the microcosm (Phys. viii. 2), as perfect to imperfect. Therefore manís happiness consists in the whole universe of creatures.
Obj. 3. Further, man is made happy by that which lulls his natural desire. But manís natural desire does not reach out to a good surpassing his capacity. Since then manís capacity does not include that good which surpasses the limits of all creation, it seems that man can be made happy by some created good. Consequently some created good constitutes manís happiness.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix. 26): As the soul is the life of the body, so God is manís life of happiness: of Whom it is written: ďHappy is that people whose God is the LordĒ (Ps. cxliii. 15).
I answer that, It is impossible for any created good to constitute manís happiness. For happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the appetite altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something yet remained to be desired. Now the object of the will, i.e., of manís appetite, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal true. Hence it is evident that naught can lull manís will, save the universal good. This is to be found, not in any creature, but in God alone; because every creature has goodness by participation. Wherefore God alone can satisfy the will of man, according to the words of Ps. cii. 5: Who satisfieth thy desire with good things. Therefore God alone constitutes manís happiness.
Reply Obj. 1. The summit of man does indeed touch the base of the angelic nature, by a kind of likeness; but man does not rest there as in his last end, but reaches out to the universal fount itself of good, which is the common object of happiness of all the blessed, as being the infinite and perfect good.
Reply Obj. 2. If a whole be not the last end, but ordained to a further end, then the last end of a part thereof is not the whole itself, but something else. Now the universe of creatures, to which man is compared as part to whole, is not the last end, but is ordained to God, as to its last end. Therefore the last end of man is not the good of the universe, but God himself.
Reply Obj. 3. Created good is not less than that good of which man is capable, as of something intrinsic and inherent to him: but it is less than the good of which he is capable, as of an object, and which is infinite. And the participated good which is in an angel, and in the whole universe, is a finite and restricted good.