Aristotle On Interpretation Chapter 12 Table of Contents Catalogue of Titles Logos Virtual Library Catalogue |
On Interpretation Translated by E. M. Edghill Chapter 12 As these distinctions have been made, we must consider the mutual relation of those affirmations and denials which assert or deny possibility or contingency, impossibility or necessity: for the subject is not without difficulty. We admit that of composite expressions those are contradictory each to each which have the verb to be its positive and negative form respectively. Thus the contradictory of the proposition man is is man is not, not not-man is, and the contradictory of man is white is man is not white, not man is not-white. For otherwise, since either the positive or the negative proposition is true of any subject, it will turn out true to say that a piece of wood is a man that is not white. Now if this is the case, in those propositions which do not contain the verb to be the verb which takes its place will exercise the same function. Thus the contradictory of man walks is man does not walk, not not-man walks; for to say man walks merely equivalent to saying man is walking. If then this rule is universal, the contradictory of it may be is it may not be, not it cannot be. Now it appears that the same thing both may and may not be; for instance, everything that may be cut or may walk may also escape cutting and refrain from walking; and the reason is that those things that have potentiality in this sense are not always actual. In such cases, both the positive and the negative propositions will be true; for that which is capable of walking or of being seen has also a potentiality in the opposite direction. But since it is impossible that contradictory propositions should both be true of the same subject, it follows that it may not be is not the contradictory of it may be. For it is a logical consequence of what we have said, either that the same predicate can be both applicable and inapplicable to one and the same subject at the same time, or that it is not by the addition of the verbs be and not be, respectively, that positive and negative propositions are formed. If the former of these alternatives must be rejected, we must choose the latter. The contradictory, then, of it may be is it cannot be. The same rule applies to the proposition it is contingent that it should be; the contradictory of this is it is not contingent that it should be. The similar propositions, such as it is necessary and it is impossible, may be dealt with in the same manner. For it comes about that just as in the former instances the verbs is and is not were added to the subject-matter of the sentence white and man, so here that it should be and that it should not be are the subject-matter and is possible, is contingent, are added. These indicate that a certain thing is or is not possible, just as in the former instances is and is not indicated that certain things were or were not the case. The contradictory, then, of it may not be is not it cannot be, but it cannot not be, and the contradictory of it may be is not it may not be, but it cannot be. Thus the propositions it may be and it may not be appear each to imply the other: for, since these two propositions are not contradictory, the same thing both may and may not be. But the propositions it may be and it cannot be can never be true of the same subject at the same time, for they are contradictory. Nor can the propositions it may not be and it cannot not be be at once true of the same subject. The propositions which have to do with necessity are governed by the same principle. The contradictory of it is necessary that it should be, is not it is necessary that it should not be, but it is not necessary that it should be, and the contradictory of it is necessary that it should not be is it is not necessary that it should not be. Again, the contradictory of it is impossible that it should be is not it is impossible that it should not be but it is not impossible that it should be, and the contradictory of it is impossible that it should not be is it is not impossible that it should not be. To generalize, we must, as has been stated, define the clauses that it should be and that it should not be as the subject-matter of the propositions, and in making these terms into affirmations and denials we must combine them with that it should be and that it should not be respectively. We must consider the following pairs as contradictory propositions:
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